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NOTE
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND SOFTWARE LICENSING: DOES THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT FAIL TO ACCOMMODATE
MODERN TECHNOLOGY?
Personal computer sales exploded in the 1980s. 1 As the personal com-
puter market grew, the software industry increased production and of-
fered a larger variety of software to meet the needs of new computer
users.2 Both small independent merchants and large chain stores often
specialize solely in software without selling any computer hardware.3
Despite the growing importance of the software industry in the United
States, uncertainty exists as to whether the Robinson-Patman Act (R.PA)
protects small software retailers against price discrimination.4 The RPA
1. R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, COMPUTER LAW: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS AND
AGREEMENTS 1.13 (1990).
2. As used in this Note, "software" means a computer program embedded in a storage device
such as a diskette or magnetic tape. In other contexts, the term "software" includes documentation
supporting the computer program and data bases readable by a computer. 1 D. BENDER, COM-
PUTER LAW: SoFrWARE PROTECTION § 2.06[l], at 2-115 (1990).
In 1988, domestic retail sales of consumer software totaled $465 million, an increase of 26% since
1987. Software Publisher's Association, Business Wire, Inc. (March 14, 1989). "Consumer
software" is software that consumers purchase for home use on personal computers. Id. From 1984
to 1988, consumer software sales increased 177%. Id. The chart below organizes the sales accord-
ing to the computer operating system and the type of software sold. Id.
Percentage Growth of Consumer Software Sales
1984-1988
Recreational General Home Total
Home Education Consumer
MS-DOS 1752.62% 1197.80% 517.07% 1214.43%
Apple II 155.73% 39.16% 144.74% 119.77%
Macintosh 98.64% 465.32% 130.51% 196.93%
Commodore 46.92% 44.81% -75.66% 15.93%
Other 89.08% 540.19% -75.80% 47.20%
Total 213.57% 275.39% 79.57% 177%
Id.
3. Computer hardware consists of the central processing unit (CPU), which performs the
computer's functions, and peripherals. Peripherals are hardware, such as disk drives, that store
information used in the CPU's functioning; printers that create a readable printout of computer
information; and a variety of other devices. R. RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 1, at 1.01[1]-[2].
4. Section 13(a) of the RPA provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
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applies to "sales" of "commodities," 5 but because the statute defines
neither term it is unclear whether a consumer software license is a com-
modities sale.
Congress passed the RPA to preserve the American tradition of the
small independent merchant. 6 The increasing number and size of chain
stores during the 1920s and 1930s threatened small retailers7 because the
chains used their buying power to procure discriminatorily low prices
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such
discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States. .. and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any peron who either grants or know-
ingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Pro-
vided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered:... And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons
engaged in selling good ware.; or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own cus-
tomers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response
to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods con-
cerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods,
obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in
discontinuance of business in goods concerned.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988) (amending Clayton Act, § 2) (emphasis added).
5. The RPA "applies only if two or more consummated sales of commodities of like grade and
quality are made at discriminatory prices by the same seller to two or more different purchasers
contemporaneously...." Hansen, Robinson-Patman Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1113, 1125-27 (1983).
6. J. MCGEE, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 99-106 (1979).
7. The Clayton Act did not combat price discrimination effectively because it exempted price
differences based on quantity. E. KIrNER & J. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW III: THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 45-46 (1983). This exemption permitted discounts that exceeded the cost
savings of large quantity sales. Note, The Distinction Between the Scope of Section 2(a) and Sections
2(d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 83 MCH L. REv. 1584, 1589-90 (1985). Another prob-
lem was that courts only applied the Clayton Act to the anticompetitive activities of sellers in rela-
tion to one another and not to the anticompetitive effects among buyers. E. KINTNER & J. BAUER,
supra, § 19.1, at 45. Furthermore, the Clayton Act provided no penalty for buyer-induced discrimi-
nation. Id. at 46. These drawbacks resulted from Congress' failure to foresee the emergence of
chain stores. Note, supra, at 1590.
During the 1930s, chain stores became prominent in the United States, with sales increasing from
four percent of total retail sales in 1919 to twenty-five percent in 1933. E. KiNTNER & J. BAUER,
supra, § 19.1, at 44-45.
The emergence of chain stores posed a considerable risk to small independent retailers. Chains
used their size and buying power to undercut the prices of their small competitors in the following
ways: 1) they reduced costs by performing many of the wholesalers' functions themselves; 2) used
their size to leverage low prices from suppliers; and 3) exploited their power to obtain promotional
allowances by using the allowances for other purposes. Id. at 44. Confronted with this growing
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from wholesalers.8 Small retailers and many members of Congress per-
ceived the chain stores' leverage as unfair.9 In response, Congress passed
the RPA.10
The RPA prohibits price discrimination in the sale of commodities
that produce anticompetitive effects at either the buyer or seller level."1
Price differentials are justified only if they result from cost savings, 12
meeting competitors' prices, 13 or if market conditions have changed.
14
By eliminating the price discrimination resulting from buying power,
Congress intended to allow small retailers to compete fairly with chain
stores. 15
crisis, small independent retailers turned to their state legislatures and Congress for help. F. RowE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON PATMAN ACT 8 (1962).
Independent retailers used the distress of the Depression and propaganda to create an anti-chain
store mood in the country. Id. (citing J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 160
(1955)). On the state level, the independent retailers' organized campaign against the chains resulted
m state taxes aimed at chain stores. Id. (citing J. PALAMOUNTAiN, supra, at 235-53). The states'
actions, however, were not very effective and therefore Congress ordered the FTC to investigate the
chain stores. Id. at 8-9.
In 1928, Congress amended the Clayton Act to remove the exemptions that had made the statute
ineffective in combating price discrimination. F.T.C. FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVES-
TIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1935) [hereinafter CHAIN STORE REPORT].
The amendment eliminated the meeting competition and quantity discount exemptions of section 2
of the Clayton Act. Id. Congress removed these exemptions to create an unqualified prohibition
against price discrimination. Id.; E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, supra, § 19.1, at 48. Specifically, its
purpose was to "protect the independent merchant, the public.., and the manufacturer... from
exploitation by his chain competitor." 79 CONG. REc. 9077 (1935) (statement of Rep. Patman).
8. J. McGEE, supra note 6, at 26-38.
9. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. Id. A seller whose price discrimination harms competitors engages in primary-line discrim-
ination. Secondary-line discrimination occurs when the discriminatory seller's customers suffer be-
cause one customer must pay a higher price than another. E. T. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 709 (1984). For a discussion
of the economic effects of price discrimination, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, THE RPA: POLICY AND LAW VOLUME 1 (1980); R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES (1976).
12. Section 13(a) of the RPA does not prohibit price differentials that "make only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are... sold .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
13. If a seller meets the prices of a competitor then no anticompetitive effect exists. See supra
note 4.
14. Section 13(a) does not "prevent price changes from time to time... in response to changing
conditions affecting the market... of the goods concerned .... "
15. Many people believed it was unfair for sellers to give discounts to chain stores but not
independent retailers when the sellers' costs of servicing each was the same. J. MCGEE, supra note
6, at 106.
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The RPA and the values it reflects are significant to the software in-
dustry because the problems faced by small retailers in the software in-
dustry parallel those posed by chain stores during the 1930s.16 When
software specialty stores first appeared, most consumers were unfamiliar
with computer hardware; therefore, the stores emphasized providing cus-
tomer service through knowledgeable salespeople. 17 The latest trend,18
however, is away from service-oriented software stores and toward super-
stores and boutiques which target a narrow market of consumers. 19 This
trend is in part the result of increased consumer sophistication and price
sensitivity.20 The superstores opening in major cities thrive on their abil-
ity to provide low prices and wide variety.21 Forecasts project a market
dominated by superstore chains with boutiques occupying distinct
niches.22 Such a scenerio threatens small independent retailers with
extinction.23
This Note contends that the RPA should apply to software transac-
tions. Part I examines the definition of "commodity" and analyzes the
likelihood that the RPA will be applied to the software industry.24 Part
II considers how the UCC and state sales tax cases define "goods" and
similar terms in the context of software transactions.25 Part III follows
courts' development of "sale" under the RPA and analyzes how courts
are likely to react to a software transaction.26 Part IV investigates how
courts define "sale" with regard to software under the UCC.27 To reflect
the policy underlying the RPA, Part V argues that courts should define
"commodity" and "sale" in software cases consistent with the UCC and
16. See Deutsch, A Shakeout for Software, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 4 (software
industry is poised for a "shakeout").
17. Id. An example of a service-intensive software company is Egghead Software. The Seattle-
based Egghead opened in the mid-1980s, and provided a friendly environment and knowledgeable
salespeople who demonstrated software products. Id.
18. Today, over 12,000 retail stores specialize in software. Id.
19. Id. Other chain stores that do not classify as super-stores are also doing extremely well.
Fourth quarter sales for Babbage's, Inc. ending February 3, 1990, rose 56%. Wall St. J., Feb. 9,
1990, § B, at 7, col. 3. At Egghead Discount Software, revenue rose 18% in the first quarter of 1990.
L.A. Times, Aug. 30, 1990, (Business), at D6, col. 3.




24. See infra notes 30-81 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 104-126 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 69:317
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state sales tax cases.2" This Note concludes that the nature of software
transactions and the software industry require that courts adopt a flexible
approach for interpreting "commodity" and "sale" in order to permit
application of the RPA to software transactions.29
I. DEFINING "COMMODITY"
A. Statutory Language and Legislative History
The RPA forbids a seller from "discriminat[ing] in price between dif-
ferent purchasers of commodities ... ..3. Although the RPA contains no
express definition of "commodity," it refers to "goods, wares or mer-
chandise" and "products" as though these terms are interchangeable
with "commodities."31 Congress' interchangeable use of these terms in-
dicates an intent to limit the definition of commodity to tangible goods.32
The legislative history of the RPA does little to clarify the definition of
"commodity." 33 The legislative history contains no discussion of "com-
modity." However, members of Congress involved in the hearings used
28. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988).
31. Section 13(a): "nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods,
wares, or merchandise ... from selecting their own customers ... " 15 U.S.C. 13(a) (1988) (empha-
sis added).
Section 13(c): "It shall be unlawful for any person... to pay or grant, or to receive or accept,
anything of value as a commission... except for services rendered in connection with the sale or
purchase of goods, wares or merchandise .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
Section 13(d): "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to pay or contract for the payment of
anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer... as compensation or in consideration for any
services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, han-
dling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured... for sale by such
person .. ." 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
32. In its report on nonsale and noncommodity transactions, the American Bar Association
points out that the definition of "commodity" is not necessarily limited to tangible goods. American
Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Report on Price Discrimination in Non-sale and Non-
Commodity Transactions 9 (1973) [hereinafter ABA Report]. The ABA Report refers to dictionary
definitions that typically define "commodity" as "anything... which affords convenience or profit,
especially in commerce." Id. (quoting WEasTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 166 (1961)).
However, the ABA Report asserts that Congress intentionally used the materialistic language
"fgoods, wares, and merchandise" and "products" interchangeably with "commodities" to limit
"commodity" to tangible goods. Id.
See also Reeves, Toward a Coherent Antitrust Policy: The Role of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act in Price Discrimination Regulation, 16 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 151, 192
(1975) (the use of words such as "goods, wares or merchandise" probably reflects the types of trans-
actions common at that time and on the minds of legislators).
33. E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, supra note 6, at 67.
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"commodity" interchangeably with terms such as "goods."34 Represen-
tative Patman later confirmed this assessment of "commodity" by stating
that he intended the term to cover "any movable or tangible thing."
35
B. Judicial Interpretation
Courts have limited the definition of commodity, including in the defi-
nition only "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery or supplies" and ex-
cluding services. 6  This definition is difficult to apply to mixed
transactions that include both goods and services aspects. 37  Further-
more, while a narrow definition of commodity arguably follows from the
legislative history and statutory language, it is counter to a Supreme
Court mandate that the RPA be construed liberally. 8
To decide whether the RPA applies to a mixed transaction, courts
concentrate on the dominant nature of the transaction.39 To differentiate
34. For instance, when Rep. Patman introduced the bill to the House of Representatives, he
exemplified groceries, dry goods, and hardware as commodities. Id.
35. W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 33 (1963).
36. CBS v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. 295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812
(1962), exemplifies the cases that approached the RPA with a limited definition of commodity. In
CBS, the Seventh Circuit held that sales of television programming sponsorship did not fall within
the RPA because "commodity" only includes "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery and supplies
.Id. at 378. See also ABA Report, supra note 32, at 11; United States v. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D.Minn. 1951) (a contract for a loan secured by real estate mort-
gages is not a commodity).
37. The Fifth Circuit recognized the problems created by the deceptively simple definition of
commodity when it stated that "[v]irtually no transfer of an intangible in the nature of a service,
right, or privilege can be accomplished without the incidental involvement of tangibles...." Tri-
State Broadcasting Co. v. UPI, 369 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted).
38. Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
39. Tri-State was the first court to articulate the dominant nature test. 369 F.2d at 270. Tri-
State cited General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co. 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 789 (1943) to support the dominant nature test, but the test was not enunciated in
General Shale. The General Shale court held that a construction contract "was not divisible into a
contract for work and labor and a contract for the sale of brick." Id. at 428. The contract price was
adjustable, depending on the amount of brick needed, and whether the purchaser chose brick or
Speedbrik, a substitute masonry unit. Id. at 427-28. However, the court reasoned that the parties
would not have agreed to merely a sale of bricks. Id. at 428. The court concluded that the agree-
ment was "clearly a construction contract" rather than a sale. Id. Although the General Shale
court's analysis compared the service and tangible aspects of the contract, the court performed the
analysis in the context of determining whether the contract was a sale, not whether the contract was
one for commodities. See Note, Running Away from Robinson-Patman: The "Commodities" Limita-
tion, Newspaper Advertising, and Small Distributors, 13 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 723, 737 n.78 (1980)
(Tri-State's dominant nature test "is not supported by precedent"). Although no precedent sup-
ported the Fifth Circuit's dominant nature test used in Tri-State, courts accept the test as the stan-
dard used to measure mixed transactions. May Dept. Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss1/13
1991] ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr AND SOFTWARE LICENSING
goods from services, courts focus on whether the tangible or intangible
components dominate the transaction.' If the the tangible goods com-
ponent dominates the transaction, courts apply the RPA.41
Courts encounter difficulty when ascertaining factors relevant to deter-
mining the dominant nature of a transaction. 2 The relative costs of the
tangible and intangible aspects of a transaction furnish one standard for
measuring dominance." However, as the Fifth Circuit noted in Aviation
Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp. ,' cost is not the sole deter-
minant of the dominant nature of a transaction.45
In Aviation Specialties, the court held that a contract for engine repair
that included supplying parts was predominantly a service contract.46
1215-16 (9th Cir. 1980) (artwork created for producing newspaper advertisements is predominantly
a service); Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 570 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1978) (contract for the repair of aircraft engines was predomi-
nantly a service contract despite the cost of the tangible parts exceeding the cost of the labor);
Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1974) (title insurance is predomi-
nantly a service); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 389 n.l (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Advanced Office Systems, Inc. v. Accounting Systems Co., 442 F.
Supp. 418, 422-23 (D.C.S.C. 1977) (contract to print billing statements was predominantly a con-
tract for intangible services).
40. Tri-State Broadcasting, 369 F.2d at 270. But see In the Matter of the Times Mirror Co., 92
F.T.C. 230, 233 (1978) (arguing that "the proper course is to construe the term 'commodities' in
light of the fundamental purposes and structure of the statute, rather than becoming preoccupied
with metaphysical considerations about what is or is not a tangible product").
41. Ten-State Broadcasting, 369 F.2d at 270.
42. "A major weakness of the dominant nature test in mixed transactions is that it provides no
concrete criteria for deciding whether the service or the commodity component dominates." Note,
supra note 39, at 741.
43. Aviation Specialties, 568 F.2d at 1191. See also Note, supra note 39.
Using cost as the primary factor of the dominant nature test creates problems because the value of
most tangible objects originates from the intangible ideas of the object's creator. When the Tennes-
see Supreme Court held that motion pictures are tangible personal property under the Tennessee
Sales Tax Law, the court said: "There is scarcely to be found any article susceptible to sale or rent
that is not the result of an idea, genius, skill and labor applied to a physical substance. A loaf of
bread is the result of the skill and labor of the cook who mixed the physical ingredients and applied
heat at the temperature and consistency her judgment dictated." Crescent Amusement Co. v. Car-
son, 187 Tenn. 112, 116, 213 S.W.2d 27, 29 (1948).
The Seventh Circuit echoed the Tennessee Supreme Court's observation when it said: "No doubt
one could dissect any service arrangement and find tangible results akin to commodities. Likewise
one could label each level of any manufacturing process as a service with incidental tangible results."
First Comics, Inc. v. World Color Press, 884 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1989).
44. 568 F.2d 1186, 1191 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. In Aviation Specialties, the defendant refused to make the plaintiff a distributor. Id. at
1189. As a result, the plaintiff could only obtain airplane parts through distributors for a 20%
discount while the distributors received a 40% discount for the same parts. Id. at 1188-89. The
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Although the cost of the tangible engine parts outweighed the cost of the
intangible maintenance service, the Fifth Circuit rejected a cost analy-
sis.4 7 Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit did not articulate the factors rele-
vant to its dominant nature analysis or how a court should weigh them.48
Likewise, none of the remaining circuits have elucidated other relevant
factors.
Courts encounter a second problem with the dominant nature test
when they attempt to differentiate the tangible and intangible aspects of a
transaction.49 Courts easily distinguish the tangible from the intangible
when the two are simple to separate conceptually, as when a contractor
provides bricks as part of a construction contract.5" Problems arise,
however, when the tangible and intangible aspects are interdependent,
for example, in newspaper advertisements.51 The advertisement provides
the valuable intangible communication service to consumers through dis-
tribution of the newspaper.52 Yet, the value of the advertisement de-
pends on its tangible nature.53 To label one aspect as dominant lacks
meaning because neither aspect would be valuable without the other.54
Thus, the dominant nature test clearly fails when the tangible and intan-
gible aspects of a transaction are inseparable.55
plaintiff alleged RPA violations, but because the service aspects of the contract at issue in Aviation
Specialties predominated, the Fifth Circuit held that the RPA did not apply. Id. at 1191.
47. Id. The idea that the RPA may not cover situations in which the service is a significant
portion of the contract was echoed in Advanced Office Systems, Inc. v. Accounting Office Systems
Co., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 418 (D.C. S.C. 1977) and General Glass Co., Inc. v. Globe Glass and Trim
Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. 61,998 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
48. Aviation Specialties, 568 F.2d at 1191.
49. In the Matter of Times Mirror Co. 92 F.T.C. 320 (1978). See also Note, supra note 39, at
742-43.
50. General Shale Prod. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942).
51. Note, supra note 39, at 743.
Although this Note addresses the interdependence of the tangible and intangible aspects in terms
of value, it does not necessarily mean monetary value. No matter how courts measure value, the
value of a transaction of an item like a computer diskette depends on the existence of the intangible
component imbedded in the diskette.
52. Id. at 739-41.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 742-43.
55. In such a 'ituation, courts can be caught up in impossible inquiries. See In the Matter of
the Times Mirror Co., 92 F.T.C. 230, 233 (1978) (the difficulty with the dominant nature test arises
when the transaction cannot easily be categorized as either a service or a tangible product because
the court becomes preoccupied "with metaphysical considerations about what is or is not a tangible
product").
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D. Software
Courts have never applied the RPA to computer software transac-
tions. 6 Yet the spectacular growth in the software industry and the re-
sulting competition among software retailers makes an RPA claim
inevitable.57 Because Congress has not defined "commodity," courts
must decide whether software constitutes a commodity for the purposes
of the RPA. Yet, the dominant nature test provides little guidance to
courts faced with software transactions because the test fails when the
tangible and intangible aspects of a transaction are interdependent.58
Courts experience complications when applying legal principles to
computer software transactions because of misunderstanding about
software.59 Much of the confusion results from focusing on the incorrect
stage of software production.6 Software begins as a programmer's intan-
gible idea.6" The programmer then translates the idea into computer lan-
guage.62 Ultimately, the computer language is embedded in a tangible
medium. 63  Because software retailers transfer software in its tangible
56. LExis and WESTLAW searches produce no cases addressing whether the RPA applies to
software transactions.
57. See supra notes 2, 16-23 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
59. This misunderstanding begins with the definition of software itself. For the purposes of this
Note, which focuses on software mass marketed to consumers, software is defined as a computer
program imbedded in a diskette. See supra note 2.
60. One problem is that courts are technically illiterate. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (concurring opinion, Bazelon, C.J.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). In
his concurrence, Judge Bazelon stressed the unreliability of judicial review of scientific evidence. Id.
To remedy this unreliability, Judge Bazelon suggested strengthening the administrative process. Id
For a further discussion of Judge Bazelon's ideas regarding courts' competence to evaluate scientific
evidence see Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
817, 817 (1977).
Second, experts cannot agree on a single definition for software. Rodau, Computer Software: Does
Article 2 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code Apply? 35 EMORY L.J. 855, 866; D. BENDER, supra note
2, § 2.06 at 2-114.
Both courts and experts use the word "software" to describe computer programs regardless of the
software's stage of development or medium. Rodau, supra, at 867-70 (flowcharts, source code, and
object code as well as programs embodied in a hard disk, diskette, magnetic tape, or a deck of
punched paper cards called software). For an in-depth discussion of the different stages of software
development and types of media upon which it can be contained, see id. at 868 n.57.
61. Software begins as a programmer's idea for instructing a computer to complete a certain
task. Id.
62. Because a computer cannot understand a pure idea, a programmer's idea must be translated
into a form that a computer understands. Id.
63. Id. at 874-75.
This Note focuses solely on mass-marketed software. Because retailers usually transfer such
Washington University Open Scholarship
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form, courts should focus on this form when deciding whether the RPA
applies.64
Based on the RPA's sparse legislative history6" and statutory lan-
guage, 66 software in its final form appears to meet the "goods, wares or
merchandise" definition of a commodity.67 However, like other mixed
transactions, software transactions involve the transfer of both tangibles
and intangibles.6" Courts faced with an RPA action involving a mixed
transaction will apply the dominant nature test.6 9
Application of the dominant nature test to software transactions, how-
ever, produces anomalous results. The majority of software's value de-
rives from its intangible intellectual property.70 Therefore, courts
balancing only the values of the tangible and intangible aspects of the
software will classify software as a noncommodity. This result, however,
undermines earlier cases that designate books and movies as commodities
under the RPA.7 1 Like software, books and movies derive most of their
value from their intellectual property.72 While the Fifth Circuit ac-
software using a diskette, this Note restricts its discussion of software's tangible medium to disket-
tes. See Note, Software and Sales Taxes: The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. REV. 181, 189 (1983)
(with regard to whether sales tax laws apply to software, courts should focus on software in its final
form because it is this form of software that retailers transfer to consumers). See also Rodau, supra
note 60, at 875. Software is similar to a book or phonograph record. Each begins as an idea that in
its final form is a tangible, movable good containing intellectual property. See id.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
68. Software consists of intangible intellectual property that comprises the computer program
and the tangible diskette in which it is embedded.
69. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
70. Rodau, supra note 60, at 879.
71. Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 389 n.l 1 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (newspapers are commodities); Reid v. Harper & Brothers, 235 F.2d 420
(2nd Cir. 1956) (books are commodities).
72. Rodau, supra note 66, at 879.
Books, like software, begin as intangible ideas. However, once translated into a physical medium,
the book exists as a tangible good like any other product. The same argument can be made vis-a-vis
phonographs and motion pictures. One may argue that software is different because it can be em-
bodied on different media such as diskettes, magnetic tapes, or punch cards. This argument fails,
however, because books can be written on paper or recorded onto phonograph records or magnetic
tape as well. One also cannot argue that software is different because it requires the use of a machine
to be valuable. Like software, casette tapes and phonograph records require the use of a machine to
be able to hear the music recorded on them. Id. at 879-80. But see McGee, Sales, Use, and Property
Taxation of Computer Software, 8 HAMLINE L. REv. 307, 314-15 (1985) (arguing that the tangible
medium used for a motion picture is distinguishable from software in that the celluloid film is a
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knowledged that courts should not consider cost alone in applying the
dominant nature test,73 no court has articulated other material factors
upon which to base an inquiry.
Further, the tangible-intangible distinction in the context of computer
software falters because of the medium's interdependent tangible and in-
tangible aspects.74 As is true of newspaper advertisements, 75 the tangi-
ble-intangible distinction reduces courts to "metaphysical considerations
about what is or is not a tangible product."'76 When a court divides the
tangible and intangible aspects, it assumes that the value of each is in-
dependent and separable.77 Under this assumption, courts will label
software a noncommodity on every occasion because the value of the
intangible intellectual property will always be greater than the value of
the tangible diskette. However, for courts to balance costs means noth-
ing because the value of the idea embodied in software and the value of
the tangible diskette depend upon one another.78
E. Proposed Analysis
The narrow judicial definition of "commodity" and the dominant na-
ture test fail to incorporate the technological advances of computer
software. When an individual obtains software from a software retailer,
the transaction resembles any other purchase of goods. As a result, one
would expect the RPA to cover software transactions. However, it is
unlikely that courts would apply the RPA to software under current defi-
nition of "commodity" because its intangible intellectual property is the
dominant component.79
Courts should adopt an approach to "commodity" consistent with the
Supreme Court's mandate that courts construe the RPA liberally.80 In-
stead of bifuracting transactions into tangible and intangible compo-
nents, courts should examine software transactions pursuant to the
concerns of the RPA. Congress' focus on tangible commodities resulted
critical artistic element of the movie); Kuo, Sales/Use Taxation of Software: An Issue of Tangibility,
2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 125, 131 (1987).
73. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
76. In the Matter of the Times Mirror Co., 92 F.T.C. 230, 233 (1978).
77. Note, Software and Sales Taxev The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. REv. 181, 188 (1983).
78. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
80. Abbott Laboratories, 422 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
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from the context in which the perceived need for the RPA arose."a
Although some characterize mass-produced consumer software as an
intangible noncommodity, it does not present the same problems as pure
service transactions excluded from RPA protection. When a retailer
transfers software to a consumer, each software package transferred is
identical to the last. Pure service transactions, however, vary greatly
from one transaction to the next. Because consumer software packages
have the same fungible properties like other consumer goods to which
the RPA applies, courts should protect independent software retailers by
applying the RPA to software transactions.
II. ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS
The application of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) and state sales tax law to software transactions suggest that the
RPA should apply to software transactions.
A. UCC Cases Defining "Commodity"
Article Two applies to "transactions in goods," 2 and defines "goods"
as all "movable" things.8 3 Like the definition of "commodity" under the
RPA, applying the seemingly simple UCC definition of a "good" under
the UCC is difficult in a mixed transaction.8 4
Under the UCC, courts utilize a predominant purpose test to deter-
mine whether the goods or service aspect of a transaction dominates.85
81. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
82. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1987) provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods; it
does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract
to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this
Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other speci-
fied classes of buyers.
U.C.C. § 2-102 (emphasis added).
83. (1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are mov-
able at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the,
price is to be paid, investment securities... and things in action ....
U.C.C. § 2-105 (1987) (emphasis added).
84. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-2, at 45 (1972); 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 63, at
319-20 (1985).
85. The predominant purpose test is equivalent to the dominant nature of the transaction test.
If the intangible services are incidental to the transaction, then it is predominantly a transaction for
goods as defined in § 2-102 and the UCC applies. Id.; Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to Computer Contracts, 14 N. Ky. L. REv. 277, 278-83 (1987). The
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Like the RPA's dominant nature test, a court will hold that the goods
aspect of a transaction predominates when the service aspect is incidental
to the transaction. 6 Given the similarity between the tests used to ana-
lyze mixed transactions under the RPA and UCC, one can reasonably
expect courts to treat software similarly in each situation.
Though few cases address whether Article Two applies to software,
courts faced with the issue consistently have applied the UCC. 7 In
many of these cases, courts have held that hardware and software sold
together in a single transaction are goods.88
The Ninth Circuit in RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc. ,89 applied
the predominant purpose test to a transaction that involved only
software.' The court applied the predominant nature test, holding that
the software contract was one for goods because the service aspects were
incidental to the total transaction. 91 The similarity of the Article Two
dominant nature of the transaction test likewise focuses on whether the service aspects of an item are
incidental to the whole transaction. Tri-State Broadcasting, 369 F.2d at 270.
86. Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (D.NJ.
1979), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1981); Triangle Under-
writers, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
87. Chados Systems, 479 F. Supp. at 742-43 (goods aspect of a contract for the sale of computer
hardware and software predominates over the incidental services included in the contract); Triangle
Underwriters, 457 F. Supp. at 769 (sale of computer system including hardware and software cov-
ered by the UCC because the design, installation, and maintenance services proved incidental to the
sale).
For a general discussion on the applicability of the UCC to software, see Note, Computer Pro-
grams as Goods Under the U.CC, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1149 (1979).
88. See supra note 88.
89. 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
90. RRX entered a contract for a software system under which Lab-Con promised to work out
all the "bugs" in the system. Id. at 545-46. When Lab-Con failed to correct problems that arose
with the software, RRX sued Lab-Con for breach of contract and fraud. Id. at 545. The court held
that whether RRX received consequential damages on their breach of contract claim depended on
whether the transaction constituted one for goods under the California Commercial Code. Id. at
546. The Ninth Circuit confused the issue by determining that the sale aspect of the transaction
dominated over the service aspect. Id. Under the predominant purpose test, the court should have
compared the goods aspect of the transaction with the service aspect. Nonetheless, the holding
clearly implies that the transaction was one for goods. Rodau, supra note 60, at 883; Owen, supra
note 86, at 282.
91. RRX Industries, 772 F.2d at 546. Other courts have held that software meets the goods
requirement in Article Two but offered no explanation of the holding. See, eg., Compu-Med Sys-
terns, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., slip opinion No. 83 Civ. 8729 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1984) (avail-
able on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (UCC applied to software contract with no discussion of
whether software is a good); Hi Neighbor Enterprises, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823
(N.D. Fla. 1980) (modification of the implied warranty of merchantability is enforceable because the
Washington University Open Scholarship
330 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:317
"goods" test to the "commodities" test under the RPA indicates that
courts should consider software a commodity under the RPA.
B. State Sales Tax Cases Defining "Commodity"
Whether software falls within the state sales tax laws depends upon
whether software qualifies as tangible or intangible.92 Like the RPA
"commodity" cases, the shortcomings of the tangible-intangible distinc-
tion result in confusion in state sales tax cases. a
Before 1983, state courts agreed that software was intangible and
therefore not subject to sales tax. 94 The rationale of some courts resem-
bled a dominant nature of the transaction analysis. These courts held
that tangible diskettes are incidental containers utilized to transfer intan-
gible computer programs." Courts' views on software began to change
in 1983 when the Maryland Supreme Court held that software is tangible
personal property.96
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., the Maryland
UCC applies to a software and hardware contract); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.
2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (UCC applies to contract for hardware and software); Communications
Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct., 1988)
(relying on RXX, Chatlos, and Triangle Underwriters and holding that software is a good).
92. Note, supra note 78, at 181.
93. Id. at 186.
94. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
95. The District of Columbia Circuit held that software is intangible and, thus, is not subject to
sales tax in District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., 465 F.2d 615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In Universal Computer, the software involved was punch cards, which could be fed through the
computer and then discarded or returned to the seller. Id. at 618. The court concluded that the
punch cards were no more than an incidental device used to transfer knowledge to the buyer. Id.
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, like Universal Computer, held that software constitutes knowl-
edge and is therefore not tangible. 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976). The Tennessee Supreme Court
found it significant that the computer program could be transferred to the computer by means other
than magnetic tape and that in this particular case, the buyer did not retain the software tapes. Id.
at 408.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals used an "essence of the transaction test" to determine that
software is intangible and, thus, not subject to state sales tax. First National Bank v. Bullock, 584
S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Like Tidwell, the court in Bullock concentrated on
software's capacity to be transferred by many means other than magnetic tape, some of which were
wholly intangible such as transfer by telephone lines. Id.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that sales tax does not apply to software because the magnetic
tapes containing the software were incidental containers and therefore the contract was in essence
one for services. James v. TRES Computer Systems, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Mo. 1982).
96. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983); See
R. RAYsMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 1, at § 7.13[1].
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Supreme Court rejected the dominant nature of the transaction test.9 7
The court repudiated earlier cases designating software as intangible.98
The court also renounced a distinction drawn by previous courts between
software and phonograph records.99 The court perceived no difference
between phonographs and software because without their tangible con-
tainers, the intangible information encoded on records and software has
no value.1°°
The difficulty the Maryland Supreme Court confronted when analyz-
ing the distinction between records and software is the same problem
faced by courts under the UCC and RPA. The problem stems from the
assumption that the tangible and intangible aspects of transactions are
always separable.101 As the Maryland Supreme Court found, it is inap-
propriate to sever the tangible from the intangible aspects of a transac-
tion involving software products.102
The increasing number of sales tax cases holding that software is a
tangible good and the similar trend in UCC cases leads one to believe
that courts should also incorporate software within the RPA's definition
of "commodity." However, given the courts' strict reading of the RPA
and adherence to the dominant nature test, the result of a price discrimi-
nation claim involving software remains uncertain. Courts should adopt
an approach to the definition of commodity under the RPA commensu-
rate with state sales tax cases and UCC cases which recognize that
software transactions are indistinguishable from other consumer
transactions. 10 3
III. DEFINING "SALE"
Section 13 of the RPA applies only to "sales," but the RPA does not
define "sale." Finding little guidance in the legislative history, courts
97. 464 A.2d 248, 261 (Md. 1983). The court in Equitable Trust actually rejected an "essence
of the transaction test," which is the same as the dominant nature of the transaction test. For the





101. Note, supra note 78, at 188.
102. Equitable Trust Co., 464 A.2d at 261 ("the sales tax statute in Maryland has never been
viewed as conceptually severing the copy of the performance from the tangible carrier").
103. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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have defined "sale" narrowly and excluded license transactions. t°4 The
difficulty in applying the RPA to software transactions is that software is
not sold, but licensed, to its users. 105 However, consumer software
licenses closely resemble sales transactions although no title passes.'"
For the RPA to cover software licenses, courts must read the definition
of "sale" more broadly than in the prior case law.
A. Statutory Language and Legislative History
Section 13107 of the RPA, which applies only to sales, strongly inidi-
cates that Congress intended the RPA to apply only to transactions in
which title passes.108 The legislative history of the Act further supports
the idea that the RPA originally contemplated only sales because the
hearings preceding the passage of the RPA do not mention license agree-
ments. 109 However, the statutory language and legislative history are not
dispositive because at the time of its passage no existing license agree-
ments resembled sales as closely as software licenses do.
B. Judicial Interpretation
Courts define "sale" pursuant to the RPA narrowly to include only
those transactions in which title passes. 110 According to precedent,
neither leases, licenses, consignment arrangements, nor agency transac-
tions fall within the definition of "sale." ' This narrow definition tends
104. ABA Report, supra note 32, at 5; see also infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
105. Rodau, supra note 60, at 887-88. Retailers transfer computer software through a license as
a means of protecting the software's trade secrets. By using a license instead of a sale, the manufac-
turer retains ownership of the software. For a discussion on the software protection through trade
secret law and copyright, see D. BENDER, supra note 2, at §§ 4.01-4.09, 4A.01-4A.03 (1989); R.
RAYSMAN & P. BROWN, supra note 1, at §§ 5.01-5.09, 6.01-6.12.
106. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text; see also, Rodau, supra note 60, at 907; D.
BENDER, supra note 2, at § 4A.02[4].
107. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
108. ABA Report, supra note 32, at 5.
109. Id. at 5-6; Reeves, supra note 32, at 192 ("Thc legislative history of the Robinson-Patman
Act indicates that the coverage of the law was limited to conventional sales .... This probably
reflects the types of business transactions most common at that time, and those foremost in the
minds of the legislators").
110. ABA Report, supra note 32, at 6; J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 90, at § 24.03[2].
111. Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1970) (a real
estate lease is not a "sale"); Loren Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Clark Mfg. Co., 241 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. IIl.
1965), 360 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1966) (no RPA violation where agent was given a larger commission
than distributor's discount), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966); Students Book Co. v. Washington
Law Book Co., 232 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (RPA not violated because campus bookstores received
preferred prices on consignment), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Record Club of America, Inc. v.
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to exclude software transactions from RPA protection because retailers
typically license software instead of selling it."1 2
Record Club of America, v. Columbia Broadcasting System,' 13 presents
a typical example of the licensing cases brought under the RPA. Record
Club involved a license agreement between licensors and Columbia
Broadcasting Systems (CBS) for unfinished phonograph records.' 14 The
plaintiff sought relief under the RPA, asserting that he bought finished
records for a price higher than CBS paid for its license. 115 The court
held that the RPA applies only to sales, and dismissed the plaintiff's
claim because he sought to compare his sale price with CBS's license
price.' 1 6
C. Software
Although strong precedent exists for excluding nonsale transactions
from the RPA's protection,1 17 no court addressing an RPA claim has
encountered a software license. 118 Retailers cannot negotiate individual
licenses for mass-marketed consumer software.1 19 Therefore, manufac-
turers utilize shrink-wrap licenses.12 A shrink-wrap license is a perpet-
ual one-time fee license that can be read through the shrink-wrap
package. 2' Opening the software package constitutes an agreement to
abide by the terms of the license.'22 Software manufacturers use these
CBS, 310 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1970); La Salle Street Press, Inc. v. McCormick and Henderson,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (licensing of a patented proofreading process is not within
the scope of the RPA because the transaction involved neither a "sale" nor a "commodity"); Gay-
lord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F.Supp.
400 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (discrimination in lease prices between tenants by a shopping center landlord
did not violate the RPA); County Theatre Co. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 933,
934 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (licensing of motion pictures not subject to the RPA). See also infra notes 114-
17 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
113. 310 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D.Pa. 1970).
114. Id. at 1243.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1246.
117. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
118. WESTLAW and LEXIS searches find no such cases; See also Vawter, Larue and Lewis,
Panel Discussion - Questions and Answers, 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 915, 917 (1984) (in reference to the
question whether software licensing is a commodity, "my understanding of the general case law is
that it would not be a commodity, it would simply be a licensing situation").
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licenses to protect the intellectual property and trade secrets contained in
their computer programs. 123
Although title does not pass in a license agreement, the RPA should
apply to software licenses because they bear a striking resemblance to
sales. 124 First, because of the difficulty in policing consumer use of mass-
marketed software, it is highly unlikely that a consumer's license will be
terminated.125 Second, consumers believe that that they are buying
software because software is licensed for a one-time fee. 12 6 Thus, the
software consumer's expectancy is the same as the expectancy of a con-
sumer who actually receives title of a good.
IV. UCC CASES DEFINING "SALE"
Courts have looked at the similarity of some leases127 and licenses 12 8 to
a sale when applying the UCC. Article Two applies solely to contracts
"relating to the present or future sale of goods." 129 However, precedent
123. Id.
124. Rodau, supra note 60, at 907.
Shrink-wrap licenses are especially relevant to this Note because they are the most common
method used by retailers to transfer software to consumers.
Software manufacturers use shrink-wrap licenses to market software to the public while protecting
the trade secrets contained in the software. A shrink-wrap license is a perpetual license paid in full
with a one time payment which grants the licensee a right to use the software. However, the license
transfers no ownership rights to the licensee. The terms usually limit the user's ability to make
copies of the software to the creation of backup copies. A license also typically limits the use of the
software to one computer and one user. Furthermore, it requires the user to protect the trade
secrets. If a user violates any term of the license, the licensor may terminate the license and demand
the return of all copies of the software. Rodau, supra note 60, at 888-89 n.144; R. RAYsMAN & P.
BROWN, supra note 1, at § 7.1lA[1]; D. BENDER, supra note 2, at § 4A.02[4]. Whether courts will
enforce shrink-wrap licenses will, in part, depend on whether tearing open the packaging constitutes
acceptance of the contract. D. BENDER, supra note 2, at § 4A.02[4]. Enforceability will also de-
pend on whether the license is unconscionable. Id. A consumer may fail to read the license agree-
ment on the software packaging, thinking that it is nothing more than advertising. Id. If this is the
case, it is likely that, at least for UCC purposes, courts would hold that a sale has occurred. Id.
For a discussion of the unconscionability of shrink-wrap licenses, see Ryan, Offers Users Can't
Refuse" Shrink-Wrap License Agreements as Enforceable Adhesion Contracts, 10 CARDOZO L REV.
2105 (1989).
125. Rodau, supra note 60, at 908.
126. Id. at 908 & n.251.
127. Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc.2d
226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. App. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 910, 316 N.Y.S. 2d 585
(App. Div. 1970) (holding that the UCC can be extended by analogy); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (the UCC applies when the lease is analogous to a sale).
128. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
129. U.C.C. § 2-106 (1987) provides:
In this Article unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and "agreement" are lim-
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indicates a trend toward applying Article Two to leases of bundled com-
puter hardware and software.13° This extension of Article Two follows
from courts' focus on whether the lease is analogous to a sale, not on the
transaction's label. 3 The same reasoning behind the judicial extension
of Article Two to leases applies to software licensing transactions, bring-
ing them within the scope of the UCC 32
The similarity between licenses and sales that extends Article Two to
software transactions is equally applicable under the RPA. As they have
done in the UCC context, courts should look at the similarity between
software transactions and other consumer sales when determining the
applicability of the RPA.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE RPA
One alternative that would bring the RPA in line with modem tech-
nology would be an amendment defining "commodity" and "sale." Con-
gress should define "commodity" as all tangible, movable goods
irrespective of the relative value or importance of their tangible and in-
tangible components. This definition would eliminate the problem cre-
ated by mixed transactions like software, while still excluding services
from RPA protection. 33 Congress should also expand the definition of
"sale" to include leases and licenses where the only difference from a sale
is that title does not pass. Unfortunately, a proposed amendment stands
little chance of passing. General hostility toward the RPA has kept Con-
ited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes
both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists
in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. A "present sale" means a sale
which is accomplished by the making of the contract.
130. United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 587 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1984) (applying
Article Two to a lease of hardware and software without discussion); Office Supply Co. v. Ba-
sic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (applying Article Two to sale of computer and
lease of software); But see In re Community Medical Center, 623 F.2d 864, 868 n.4 (3d Cir. 1980);
W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex, Civ. App. 1979).
131. Rodau, supra note 60, at 898 & n.192.
132. Id. at 901. In Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., the New
York City Civil Court applied Article Two to perpetual software licenses and held that they were
equivalent and analogous to sales. 138 Misc. 2d 80, 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1988);
Computer Network Corp., v. Compmail Systems, Inc., No. 84 C 6813 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist. file) (UCC applies to perpetual licenses by analogy to sales).
133. Services must be excluded because the portion of the RPA requiring that the goods be of
like grade or quality would lead to enormous difficulty if applied to services.
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gress from amending it in the past."M Therefore, it does not seem likely
that Congress will expand the scope of the RPA by amendment.
The more practical solution is for courts to expand the definition of
"commodity" and "sale" on a case-by-case basis. This approach will al-
low courts to keep the RPA commensurate with its underlying policies.
This approach is better than a congressional amendment because it
avoids the possibility that a statutory definition might exclude future
technology, and it will give courts the necessary flexibility to determine
which transactions are essentially equivalent to the sales of commodities
under the RPA. Whether this solution changes the current state of the
law under the RPA will depend on courts' willingness to follow the
Supreme Court's mandate to construe the RPA flexibly.135
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the RPA in response to the Clayton Act's failure to
adapt to the trend in retail toward chain stores. 36 Today, it is the RPA
that has failed to adapt to the development of new technologies in com-
merce. The problem is not that Congress did not intend the RPA to
apply to transactions like software licensing, but that in defining the
Act's jurisdictional elements, courts failed to foresee products such as
software. When applied to software, the dominant nature test produces a
result inconsistent with the RPA's policy. 137 Likewise, the courts failed
to recognize the development of the perpetual licenses necessary to pro-
tect software trade secrets. 138 Software transactions require a more flexi-
ble approach to the definition of both "commodity" and "sale." Either
an amendment to the RPA or a more flexible judicial interpretation of
the terms that focuses on the policies and purpose of the RPA is neces-
sary to avoid the elimination of independent software retailers.
John J Voorhees, Jr.
134. See 1 American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
POLICY AND LAW 8-19 (1980).
135. Abbott, 422 U.S. at 11.
136. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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